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Abstract: The literature on the relationship between environmental regulations (ERs) 
and environmental performance (EP) of firms has largely ignored consideration of 
different types of ERs. This study uses the literature to differentiate three types 
of ERs (command-and-control ERs, market-based ERs and informal regulations) and 
investigate the positive links between different types of ERs and EP. This study 
further investigates (i) the potential non-linear relationships and (ii) whether 
the specific ERs-EP link varies across different regions of China (Eastern and 
Inland). The results provide support for considering different types of ERs, while 
there is no evidence of a positive relationship with EP when ERs are taken together; 
there is evidence of a non-linear relationship between command-and-control ERs and 
EP, and, market-based ERs and EP. The relationship between informal regulations and 
EP is neutral. In addition, the link between market-based ERs and EP varies across 
two regions, whereas the link between command-and-control ERs and EP, and the link 
between informal regulations and EP do not vary across different regions. The results 
highlight the differing emphasis of enforcing regulations in various parts of China, 
and provide some valuable implications. 
 
Keywords: environmental regulations; environmental performance; non-linear 
relationship; China; regional perspective 
1.Introduction 
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Over the past decades, China has been experiencing rapid economic growth rate and 
has become the world's second largest economy in 2010. However, the accelerated 
development process of economy has also resulted in significant environmental issues 
as the growth model in China now is still extensive and unsustainable (Xie et al., 
2017). For instance, China has frequently experienced the hazy weather in Eastern 
and northeastern regions (Zhao et al., 2016) and environmental incidents have 
occurred frequently in recent years (Tong, 2009). How to realize the coordinated 
development of economy and the environment has attracted more and more attention 
from the government, academics and practitioners (Jiménez, 2005).  
Environmental regulations (ERs) can be regarded as an important way to reduce the 
effects of economic activity on the natural environment (Blohmke et al., 2016; Yu 
et al., 2017). ERs is defined as “a set of characteristics for government 
environmental policies aimed at mitigating a firm's impact on the natural 
environment and creating a context where a firm will engage in environmental 
innovation” (Eiadat et al., 2008, p. 134). Since the great importance of ERs, 
governments worldwide all try to establish a sound and mature environmental 
governance system (Picazo-Tadeo and García-Reche, 2007). Generally, ERs can be 
divided into three different types, namely command-and-control ERs (CMCER), 
market-based ERs (MBER) and informal regulations (INFER) (Xie et al., 2017; Zheng 
and Shi, 2017). Moreover, CMCER and MBER can be treated as formal regulations. With 
respect to INFER, they have become another big driver of environmental protection 
and exert positive effects on firms’ behavior (Zhang et al., 2008). INFER can be 
a useful supplement to affect firms’ environmental practices, especially when 
formal regulations are weak or absent (Féres and Reynaud, 2012). However, INFER are 
not imposed by the government, but depend on public environmental awareness 
(Wesselink et al., 2011; Xie et al., 2017). 
The importance of ERs has not only attracted the attention from the government but 
also scholars. Many scholars have investigated the impacts of ERs, such as the 
impacts of ERs on innovation, on competitive advantages, on financial performance 
or productivity (Testa et al., 2011). Most of these studies stem from Porter 
Hypothesis. For the government, one main purpose of enacting and implementing a 
series of ERs is to reduce negative environmental impacts and improve environmental 
quality (Dasgupta et al., 2001). However, the empirical results of the impacts of 
ERs on EP are inconclusive. All possible results including positive, neutral and 
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negative impacts have been found (Camisón, 2010; Féres and Reynaud, 2012). Besides, 
scholars also divide ERs into different types and study whether different types of 
ERs have heterogeneous impacts on EP (Féres and Reynaud, 2012; Zhao et al., 2015a). 
Furthermore, a few scholars also explore the potential complex link between ERs and 
EP. They have taken some organizational variables that may affect the ERs-EP link 
into consideration and investigate whether these variables can moderate or mediate 
the focal link (Guo et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2017). All these inclusive results 
further promote us to think about what the real relationship between ERs and EP is 
and if ERs can improve EP directly or not. If not, how to exert their positive impacts 
on EP as the original purpose of the government aims to.  
In this paper, the research questions are studied from Chinese provincial-level. 
We collect relevant data from different statistical yearbooks. 30 provinces are 
included and the time periods cover from 2004 to 2014. The first contribution of 
our research is to provide more empirical evidence from an emerging country as 
scholars have pointed out most of prior studies focus on US or European context 
(Horváthová, 2010; Muhammad et al., 2015). 
Besides, extant literature is rather limited to distinguish the different impacts 
of different types of ERs (Xie et al., 2017). The form of ERs can be important in 
determining the nature of its relationship with performance (Iraldo et al., 2011). 
Hence, we also differentiate three different types of ERs and attempt to investigate 
the nature of the links between different types of ERs and EP. 
Furthermore, most of prior studies investigate the linear relationship between ERs 
and EP, there is no empirical research that has investigated the potential non-linear 
relationships. We believe that institutional theory (IT) and stakeholder theory (ST) 
help to lay theoretical foundations for the potential non-linear link between ERs 
and EP. Hence, we not only investigate the positive links between different types 
ERs and EP, but also explore the non-linear links between different types of ERs 
and EP in this paper. To the best of our understanding, this is the first paper to 
examine the potential non-linear link between ERs and EP. 
Lastly, it is well-known that China is a big country and different regions are 
significantly different in economic development level. Compared with Central and 
Western regions, Eastern regions are much developed in economic development (Bian 
et al., 2015). The significant difference in economic development may further lead 
to firms face different levels of pressures. It may further shape the relationship 
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between ERs and EP differently. Therefore, we examine whether the link between ERs 
and EP varies across different regions or not. Taken together, our research extends 
the extant literature by providing an overall picture for exploring the nature of 
the impacts of ERs on EP. 
To conclude, this study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, 
ours is one of the few studies focusing on a developing country in this context. 
Second, ours is one of the few studies to look at the relationships between different 
kinds of ERs and EP. Third, our study focuses both on potential linear and non-linear 
relationships. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Theoretical background and hypothesis 
development are included in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data, variable 
measurement and the methodology. Followed by results and discussions in Section 4. 
Conclusions are available in Section 5.   
  
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Institutional theory and stakeholder theory  
IT can be borrowed to explain the underlying connection between ERs and EP. 
Institutional theory suggests that organizations and their members are strongly 
affected by the networks in which they operate (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). More 
specifically, it can help to explain how isomorphic institutional pressures lead 
to common organizational practices (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Scholars have 
demonstrated that institutional pressures have great impacts on shaping firms’ 
environmental practice (Brammer et al., 2012). As a response to institutional 
pressures, firms have to behave properly to prevent environmental degradation so 
that they can obtain a “license to operate” and to gain legitimacy through external 
agents (Aguilera-caracuel and Ortiz-de-Mandojana, 2013; Bansal, 2005). Building 
upon IT, ERs, as an important part of institutional pressures, can promote firms 
to engage in environmental initiatives and improve environmental quality. 
Another widely accepted theory that can be employed to explain the effects of ERs 
on EP is ST. Currently, firms face a multitude of stakeholder pressures and 
stakeholders have concerned more and more with environmental issues (Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). In response to the increasing 
stakeholder pressures, it is important for firms to adopt more proactive 
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environmental strategies or implement environmental practice (Yu and Ramanathan, 
2015). The reasons lie in that taking stakeholders into account usually bring 
significant financial benefits (Wagner and Schaltegger, 2004). Moreover, firms take 
their relationships with stakeholders into account can help to set corporate 
direction and improve their organizational practices (Roberts, 1992). Therefore, 
stakeholder pressures could motivate companies to take more consideration of 
environmental issues and may encourage them to incorporate environmental practices 
into their management strategies (Ramanathan et al., 2014). To conclude, stakeholder 
pressures can lead firms to devote more resources to address environmental issues 
and thus improve environmental quality. 
Grounding our research on IT and ST, they can explain why firms engage in 
environmental initiatives and reduce negative environmental impacts under the 
background of ever-increasing institutional pressures and stakeholder pressures. 
In all, both IT and ST can support the positive impacts of ERs on EP.  
 
2.2 Three different types of ERs and practice in China 
As noted previously, ERs can be generally divided into three different types and 
different types of ERs have their own characteristics.  
For CMCER, the government usually sets a series of emissions limits and abatement 
technical standards aim to reduce emissions of the pollutants into the natural 
environment (Blackman, 2010). Firms whose real emissions exceed the emission 
standard will be fined or asked to improve the production process, or even forced 
to shut down (Xie et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2012). CMCER usually force firms to 
adopt the existing end-of-pipe technologies or switch to clean energy to reduce the 
amounts of emissions (Xie et al., 2017). However, CMCER are frequently criticized 
by the lack of flexibility in implementation (Camisón, 2010; Ramanathan et al., 2017). 
MBER are another widely used methods adopted by the government to regulate pollutant 
emissions. Although the government also establishes limits in polluting levels and 
applies controls and penalties, this kind of ERs is based on economic instruments 
and provide firms with the flexibility to adopt or invest suitable methods to reduce 
their negative environmental impacts (Camisón, 2010; Zhao et al., 2015b). MBER are 
more likely to spur firms to employ pollution prevention technologies to reduce 
pollutant emissions (Zhao et al., 2015b). Currently, the main instruments of MBER 
include taxes, pollutant charge fees, tradable permits and refund system (Jaffe et 
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al., 2002; Khanna, 2001; Zhao et al., 2015b). Opposed to CMCER and MBER, which are 
usually treated as formal regulations, INFER do not belong to coercive policies, 
but depend on public environmental awareness (Wesselink et al., 2011; Xie et al., 
2017). INFER also aim to modify the behavior of polluting firms then improve 
environmental quality. They are usually corresponding with all types of actions 
taken by citizens, communities or environmental NGOs or by the market such as 
consumers and investors (Féres and Reynaud, 2012; Zhang et al., 2008).   
With the practice of ERs in China, the central government has also paid great efforts 
to build up a mature and sound environmental governance system to regulate firms’ 
behavior. The first national environmental law in China came into effect in 1979. 
Since then, the government has accelerated the process of environmental legislation 
and enacted a series of environmental laws, regulations and norms at both the 
national level and local level (Lo et al., 2009). Currently, command-and-control 
regulations are the main parts of ERs (Xie et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015b). Apart 
from these CMCER, MBER have also been introduced to regulate firms’ behavior. To 
date, pollutant discharge fees and tradable emissions are two main types of economic 
instruments adopted by the Chinese government. The policy of pollutant discharge 
fees was issued nationwide in 2003, whereas the policy of tradable emission is still 
in its pilot stage and this policy is only implemented in some selected cities. For 
formal regulations, most of these environmental policies are enacted by the central 
government, but local governments have great freedom in deciding how to enforce these 
policies (Shen et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015a). In terms of INFER, public 
environmental awareness has improved in recent years and the public is more and more 
involved in environmental issues. Pressures from citizens, communities, market, 
investors and environmental NGOs start to play more and more active roles in 
enhancing environmental quality in today’s China (Zhang et al., 2008; Zheng and 
Shi, 2017). 
 
2.3 The positive relationship between ERs and EP 
In accordance with IT and ST, many prior studies have demonstrated the positive 
impacts of ERs on EP. The positive impacts of ERs on EP have been validated in several 
countries including in Brazil (Seroa da Motta, 2006), in China (Dasgupta et al., 
2001; B. Liu et al., 2010), in EU countries (De Brito et al., 2008), in UK (Ramanathan 
et al., 2014). Besides, Baylis et al. (1998) show that ERs is the most common source 
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of improving industrial EP. Esty and Porter (2002) argue that cross-country 
differences in EP are associated with the quality of the environmental regulatory 
regime in place. Kagan et al. (2003) find that tightening regulatory requirements 
and intensifying political pressures have brought about large improvements in EP. 
Gouldson et al. (2014) reveal that difference in environmental regulatory standards 
usually results in different industrial EP across different countries. 
 
2.3.1 Relationships between various types of ERs and EP 
There are some scholars further divide ERs into different types and investigate their 
impacts on EP. One popular way is to divide ERs into formal regulations and informal 
regulations. The empirical results across different countries support the positive 
impacts of formal and informal regulations on EP including in Indonesia by Pargal 
and Wheeler (1996); in Korean manufacturing plants by Aden et al. (1999); in UK 
manufacturing sectors by Cole et al. (2005); and in Brazilian manufacturing firms 
by Féres and Reynaud (2012). Besides, Mendes and Santos (2008) show that economic 
instruments such as stringent emission charges and European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme are better instruments for curbing emissions from air transport. Camisón 
(2010) demonstrate that both cooperative and individual auto-regulation can spur 
firms with a more advanced environmental adaptation and consequently with a high 
EP. Zhao et al. (2015a) indicate that market-based regulations and government 
subsidies have positive impacts on CO2 reduction.  
From the theoretical perspective, both IT and ST can help to explain why firms adopt 
environmental practice and reduce their adverse impacts on the natural environment. 
They can further suggest the positive impacts of ERs on EP.  
Overall, both CMCER and MBER enacted and enforced by the government attempt to 
regulate firms’ behavior and protect the environment (Dasgupta et al., 2001). 
Meanwhile, INFER are also another big driver for firms to engage in environmental 
initiatives and help to improve EP (Liu et al., 2010; Wesselink et al., 2011; Zhang 
et al., 2008). Hence, we posit our hypotheses as follows. 
H1：There is a positive relationship between ERs and EP.  
H1a: There is a positive relationship between CMCER and EP.  
H1b: There is a positive relationship between MBER and EP. 
H1c: There is a positive relationship between INFER and EP. 
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2.4 The non-linear relationship between ERs and EP  
Apart from the positive link, previous studies also suggest the neutral or negative 
link between ERs and EP. Anton et al. (2004) find that regulatory and market-based 
pressures do not have a direct impact on toxic releases but an indirect effect by 
encouraging institutional changes in the management of environmental concerns. 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) reveal that regulatory stakeholders have no relation 
between congressional district voting records and toxic emissions. Zhang et al. 
(2008) demonstrate that regulatory system does not have positive impacts on EP, 
especially when firms meet the basic compliance requirement. Camisón (2010) 
indicates that the effectiveness of coercive regulation in promoting environmental 
adjustment in firms is negative. Agan et al. (2013) argue that government regulations 
alone are not an effective way to deal with environmental pollution and climate 
change. Guo et al. (2017) claim that ERs has direct negative impact on regional green 
grow performance. Graafland and Smid (2017) reveal that perceived social license 
pressure is a stronger stimulus than government regulation in improving EP.  
Some scholars also investigate the potential indirect link between ERs and EP. Some 
organizational variables have been incorporated into the research framework to 
investigate their moderating or mediating effects on the focal link. These 
moderators or mediators include environmental management system (Iraldo et al., 2009; 
Phan and Baird, 2015), environmental investment or innovation (Böhringer et al., 
2012), environmental innovation strategy (Yu et al., 2017), technological 
innovation (Guo et al., 2017), among others.   
Hence, the relationship between ERs and EP may be more complex than simple positive. 
As noted previously, the government aims to protect the environment and improve 
environmental quality via different environmental policy instruments (Horbach et 
al., 2012). However, laxer ERs cannot affect firms’ behavior effectively as firms 
may just meet the minimum compliance requirement of ERs. Some firms may even pay 
the penalties directly, especially when the compliance cost is much higher than 
penalty cost (Zhang et al., 2008). Besides, local governments have great freedom 
in deciding how to implement ERs (Shen et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015a). The 
significant difference in economic development level can result in different 
implementation of ERs (Jiménez, 2005; Lo et al., 2009). In less developed regions, 
local governments may still favor economy than the environment so that ERs may not 
be implemented strictly and they may exert limited pressures on firms 
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(Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2003). What is more, pressures from 
citizens, communities, investors, customers, and environmental NGOs in less 
developed regions can be weak as well (Xie et al., 2017). Due to the limited pressures 
ERs exert, they cannot affect firms’ behavior positively. Firms may still pay more 
attention to economic development and ignore to protect the environment. Hence, the 
link between ERs and EP can be negative.  
However, with the ever-deteriorating natural environment and the development of 
economy, stakeholders (government, communities, citizens, investors, customers and 
environmental NGOs) may concern more and more about environmental protection. The 
increasing pressures together can force the government tries to realize the 
coordinated development between the environment and economy (Bi et al., 2015). 
Consequently, the government may improve the intensity of ERs significantly and 
require local governments to implement ERs strictly. As a response to the increasing 
pressures, firms may not only meet the requirements of ERs, but also adopt more 
proactive technologies rather than reactive technologies to address environmental 
issues (Yu et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2008). In this regard, ERs can start to exert 
positive impacts on EP.  
From the theoretical perspective, IT and ST both suggest institutional pressures 
or stakeholder pressures can affect firms’ environmental practice positively. 
However, we argue that these pressures can exert their positive impacts only after 
arriving at a certain level. When the pressures are limited, they cannot have 
significant impacts on firms’ environmental practice. 
In sum, ERs can have negative impacts on EP, once the intensity of ERs arrives at 
a certain level, ERs can play positive impacts on EP. Based on what we have discussed 
above, we propose the following hypotheses.  
H2：There is a non-linear relationship between ERs and EP. 
H2a: There is a non-linear relationship between CMCER and EP. 
H2b: There is a non-linear relationship between MBER and EP. 
H2c: There is a non-linear relationship between INFER and EP. 
 
2.5 The regional variation of the relationship between ERs and EP 
Given the uneven economic development level in China, Eastern regions are much 
developed than in Central and Western regions (Bian et al., 2015). Different economic 
development level can lead to local governments implement ERs differently (Jiménez, 
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2005; Lo et al., 2009). For less developed regions, local governments may place a 
priority on economic development rather than protecting the environment. But for 
much developed regions, local governments may try to realize the coordinated 
development between economy and the environment. Hence, for the same type of ERs, 
local governments in less developed regions may not implement ERs strictly so that 
they can exert limited pressures on regulating firms’ behavior, while local 
governments in much developed regions may implement ERs strictly and thus exert 
strong pressures on regulating firms’ behavior (Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012; 
Tang et al., 2003). According to IT and ST, we argue that only strong enough pressures 
can have positive impacts on firms’ environmental practice. In addition, compared 
with less developed regions, stakeholders such as citizens, communities, investors, 
customers and environmental NGOs in much developed regions can pay more attention 
to environmental issues (Xie et al., 2017). Hence, pressures from the public in much 
developed regions can be much stronger than in less developed regions. Overall, 
different economic development level can result in different implementation of ERs 
and also lead to public environmental awareness significantly different in different 
regions. Hence, ERs in different regions are likely to exert different levels of 
pressures on firms’ practice and further result in the variation of the ERs-EP link 
across different regions. Based on the above argument, our hypotheses are posited 
as follows. 
H3: The link between ERs and EP varies across different regions.  
H3a: The link between CMCER and EP varies across different regions.  
H3b: The link between MBER and EP varies across different regions.  
H3c: The link between INFER and EP varies across different regions. 
 
3.Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Data and sample 
In this study, we collect provincial-level data from different Chinese statistical 
yearbooks, including China environmental statistical yearbook, China industry 
economy statistical yearbook (name changed as China industry statistical yearbook 
after 2013), China energy statistical yearbook, China statistical yearbook on 
science and technology and China statistical yearbook. The research periods cover 
from 2004 to 2014. We exclude Tibet because of missing data. We finally include 30 
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provinces, autonomous regions, city in mainland due to the availability of data 
(hereinafter all referred to as province). Drawing on the traditional method of 
geographic division, China can be divided into three main regions (Eastern regions, 
Central regions and Western regions) (Yang and Wang, 2013). Eastern regions consist 
of 11 coastal provinces, whereas the other two regions belong to Inland provinces 
(Hu and Wang, 2006). Besides, compared with Eastern regions, Central and Western 
regions are less developed and quite similar in economic development level (Bian 
et al., 2015). There is no significant difference between Central and Western regions 
in the mean value of Per_GDP as the T-test value is insignificant (t=0.861, p=n.s., 
data from National Bureau of Statistic and authors’ calculation). Hence, Central 
and Western regions are called “Inland regions” in this paper on the basis of 
geographic division. This terminology is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Wei 
et al. 2017; Zheng and Shi 2017). The details of the division of 30 provinces can 
be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 Regions information considered in this study  
Regions  Provinces included  
Eastern 
regions 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan 
Inland 
regions 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and 
Jiangxi (Central regions)  
Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Yunnan, Xinjiang, Sichuan and Chongqing (Western 
regions) 
 
3.2 Variable measurement 
 
Dependent variable: Environmental performance  
EP can be defined as “measures how successful a firm is in reducing and minimizing 
its impact on the environment, often relative to some industry average or peer group” 
(Klassen and McLaughlin 1996, p. 1199). To data, many different methods have been 
used to capture EP. The most popular way is to use independent database provided 
by the third parties, such as Toxic Release Inventory (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997); Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini index (e.g. Delmas et al., 
2015; Graves and Waddock, 1999; Griffin and Mahon, 1997); Britain’s Most Admired 
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Companies in UK (e.g. Ramanathan et al., 2015); European Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Register (EPRTR) (e.g. Horváthová, 2012); Australia PRTR (APRTR) (e.g. 
Muhammad et al., 2015); Japanese PRTR (e.g. Fujii et al., 2013; Nakao et al., 2007b). 
Besides, some scholars also use pollutant emissions as proxies for EP, such as waste 
intensity and greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Fujii et al., 2013; Iwata and Okada, 
2011; Trumpp and Guenther, 2015); industry environmental emission intensity (e.g. 
Qi et al., 2014); aggregated index of emissions (e.g. Telle, 2006; Wagner, 2005). 
Furthermore, some other methods have also been used including environmental ratings 
or environmental certifications (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2010; Russo and Fouts, 1997); 
the results of questionnaire survey (e.g. Nakao et al., 2007a; Ramanathan, 2016); 
the adoption of environmental policy, environmental management systems or 
environmental strategy (e.g. Halkos and Sepetis, 2007; Thomas, 2001; Watson et al., 
2004). 
Basing on the concept of EP, we select several main environmental pollutants that 
each province releases to air, water and land to reflect their overall impacts on 
the natural environment in this paper. The details of environmental pollutants data 
collected can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2 Environmental pollutants included in this study 
Data Description Unit  
Waste 
water 
Total volume of industrial waste water discharged 10000 tons 
Total volume of chemical oxygen demand discharged 10000 tons 
Waste gas 
Total volume of industrial waste gas emissions 100 million cu.m 
Total volume of industrial soot and dust emissions 10000 tons 
Total volume of industrial sulphur dioxide emissions 10000 tons 
Total volume of industrial ammonia nitrogen 
emissions 
10000 tons 
Waste 
solid 
Total volume of industrial solid wastes discharged 10000 tons 
To reflect the overall environmental impacts of each province, we need to integrate 
all these different types of data. Here we use the comprehensive index method and 
follow the three step process suggested by Zhao and Sun (2016). But there are some 
differences. In our research, indicator j is measured as the industrial output value 
in province i divided by one of the environmental pollutants mentioned above to 
eliminate the effect of scale. In addition, note that we study the research questions 
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from provincial-level. Hence, the city-level data has been changed as 
provincial-level data in our study accordingly. The final calculation results are 
used to capture EP. Obviously, the higher EP, the better is. 
 
Independent variable: Environmental regulations  
It is also the same that scholars have employed multiple methods to measure ERs. 
For instance, pollution abatement costs and expenditures (e.g. Hamamoto, 2006; Jaffe 
and Palmer, 1997; Kneller and Manderson, 2012; Majumdar and Marcus, 2001); the 
questionnaire survey results (e.g. Yu et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015a, 2015b); the 
intensity of pollutant emissions (e.g. Shen et al., 2017; Zhao and Sun, 2016) ; Gross 
National Income per capita (e.g. Aguilera-caracuel and Ortiz-de-Mandojana, 2013; 
Pargal and Wheeler, 1996); the number of inspections (e.g. Iraldo et al., 2011; Telle 
and Larsson, 2007).  
In this paper, we use the number of environmental administrative penalty cases that 
the government decides every year to capture CMCER. A natural logarithm is adopted 
to further eliminate the potential heteroscedasticity (Hu et al., 2017; Wang and 
Shen, 2016). For the measurement of MBER, we use pollutant discharge fees as a proxy. 
The reason lies in China has established a mature pollutant levying system based 
on pollutant discharge fees, but the policy of tradeable emissions is still in pilot 
stage (Xie et al., 2017; Zheng and Shi, 2017). To further eliminate the effects of 
different scales, pollutant discharge fees (in 10 thousand yuan) are divided by 
industrial output value (in 100 million yuan) in each province. With respect to the 
measurement of INFER, we employ the number of complaint letters on pollution and 
environmental related problems in this paper since local citizens and communities 
are more sensitive to environmental degradation (Zheng and Shi, 2017). With the 
popularity of the Internet and telephone, citizens can complain environmental issues 
via E-mail and telephone and relevant department also included this data into China 
environmental statistical yearbook after 2011. Therefore, the number of complaint 
letters on pollution and environmental related problems (including complaints 
received from E-mail and telephone) is used to measures INFER. A natural logarithm 
is also adopted to eliminate the dimensions and effects of different variances (Hu 
et al., 2017). 
 
Control variables 
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Several control variables are included to ensure that the relationship is not the 
result of other confounding factors that have been identified. All control variables 
are described in Table 3. 
Table 3 Measurement of control variables  
Variable  Name Measurement  
Per capita GDP Per_GDP 
We use per capita GDP (in 10 thousand yuan/capita) to 
control the effect of economic development level in this 
paper. 
Foreign direct 
investment 
FDI 
We use the ratio of FDI (in 100 million USD) to GDP (in 
100 million yuan) in each province to capture the effect 
of FDI. 
Energy 
consumption 
Energy 
We employ the ratio of the number of energy consumption 
(in 10000 tce) to GDP (in 100 million yuan) in each 
province to control the effect of energy consumption. 
R&D 
expenditure 
R&D 
We use the ratio of intramural R&D expenditure (in 100 
million yuan) to industrial output value (in 100 million 
yuan) in each province to control the effect of R&D 
expenditure in this paper. 
Industrial 
scale 
Scale 
We use the proportion of the industrial output value (in 
100 million yuan) to the number of industrial enterprises 
(in unit) in each province to control the effect of scale. 
 
3.3 Model selection 
In the present paper, two econometric models are constructed to verify the hypotheses 
we proposed. To verify the positive link between ERs and EP, the linear regression 
model is used (shown in Model 1). 
EP𝑖𝑡 = C + 𝛼1𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑒𝑟_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡                         𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 1 
To verify the non-linear link between ERs and EP, a quadratic functional form of 
regression model is employed (shown in Model 2). In this quadratic function, ERs 
is incorporated as a linear term as well as a quadratic term. The linear term of 
ERs can be treated as the predictor in the link between ERs and EP, whereas the 
quadratic term of ERs can be regarded as the moderator (Pierce and Aguinis, 2011). 
To avoid the potential multi-collinearity problem caused by the quadratic term, ERs 
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are centered before adding into the model (Aiken and West, 1991). 
EP𝑖𝑡 = C + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                     𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2 
Table 4 presents the results of descriptive statistics of all variables. We further 
provide the results of the test for equality of mean and median difference of main 
variables between two different regions in Table 5. Seeing at the last two columns, 
both the mean and median value of the variables between two regions are significantly 
different as T-test value and Chi-square are all significant at 1% level. They can 
give support that different regions implement ERs differently. Besides, the results 
also demonstrate that EP and economic development level in Eastern regions are much 
higher than in Inland regions as the mean value of EP and Per_GDP are much higher. 
Correlation coefficients of variables are available in Table 6.  
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of all variables included in this paper 
Variable  Mean S.D. Min Max 
EP 0.781 0.250 0.192 1.473 
CMCER 7.325 1.385 2.079 10.56 
MBER 8.601 5.947 0.440 46.79 
INFER 9.540 1.406 3.912 12.27 
Per_GDP 3.135 2.049 0.432 10.52 
FDI 0.056 0.074 0.007 0.750 
Energy 1.201 0.659 0.320 4.323 
R&D 0.023 0.026 0.003 0.172 
Scale 2.436 1.592 0.407 8.739 
Table 5 Test for equality of mean and median difference of main variables between two regions 
Variables 
Eastern regions Inland regions 
T-test Chi-square 
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
EP 121 0.961 0.984 209 0.677 0.673 11.882*** 65.781*** 
CMCER 121 7.98 8.518 209 6.946 7.14 6.990*** 39.474*** 
MBER 121 5.527 4.634 209 10.38 8.709 -7.758*** 24.128*** 
INFER 121 10.1 10.263 209 9.216 9.449 5.769*** 42.397*** 
Per_GDP 121 4.608 4.111 209 2.281 2.005 11.872*** 51.792*** 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
Table 6 Correlation coefficients of all variables  
 
EP CMCER MBER INFER Per_GDP FDI Energy R&D Scal
e EP 1       
  
CMCER 0.241*** 1      
  
MBER -0.491**
* 
0.023 1     
  
INFER 0.269*** 0.515*** -0.371**
* 
1      
Per_GD
P 
0.404*** 0.237*** -0.525**
* 
0.438*** 1   
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FDI 0.374*** -0.076 -0.269**
* 
-0.002 0.272*** 1  
  
Energy -0.454**
* 
-0.319**
* 
0.644*** -0.552**
* 
-0.553**
* 
-0.278**
* 
1   
R&D 0.324*** 0.227*** -0.310**
* 
0.247*** 0.507*** 0.111** -0.381**
* 
1 
 
Scale 0.528*** 0.065 -0.492**
* 
0.193*** 0.669*** 0.308*** -0.324**
* 
0.390**
* 
1 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
 
4. Results and discussions 
 
4.1 Regression rResults of the link between command-and-control ERs and EP 
Table 7 presents the regression results of the link between CMCER and EP. For the 
whole of China, the direct link between CMCER and EP is negative but not significant 
(α=-0.0083, p=n.s.). Hence, H1a is not supported. But the non-linear regression 
results show contrasting results. The coefficient of the linear term of CMCER is 
significantly negative (β=-0.1064, p<0.1)，and the coefficient of the quadratic 
term of CMCER is significantly positive (β=0.0069, p<0.1) for the whole of China. 
The results provide support for the non-linear relationship between CMCER and EP 
in China. Thus, H2a is supported. We further analyze the variation of the 
relationship between ERs and EP across two regions. For Eastern regions, both the 
significance of the linear term of CMCER in Model 1 and the significance of the 
quadratic term of CMCER in Model 2 are insignificant. For Inland regions, the results 
are almost consistent with Eastern regions. Both the significance of the direct link 
and the non-linear link between CMCER and EP are insignificant. Hence, the results 
do not support H3a as the link between CMCER and EP are both neutral in Eastern and 
Inland regions.  
 
4.2 Results Regression results of the link between market-based ERs and EP 
The regression results of the link between MBER and EP are presented in Table 8. 
For the whole of China, the direct link between MBER and EP is negative and 
significant (α=-0.0130, p<0.01). The non-linear regression results show that the 
coefficient of the linear term of MBER is negative (β=-0.0286, p<0.01), and the 
coefficient of the quadratic term of MBER is positive and significant (β=0.0004, 
p<0.01). However, the F-statistic and adjusted-R2 of Model 2 are much higher than 
that of Model 1, it can be concluded that there is evidence for a non-linear 
relationship between MBER and EP in China. Thus, H1b is not supported, but H2b is 
supported. For Eastern regions, only the coefficient of MBER in Model 1 is 
An earlier version of the paper accepted for publication in Journal of Cleaner Production, June 2018 
17 
 
significantly negative (α=-0.0257, p<0.01). It can support that there is a negative 
link between MBER and EP in Eastern regions. For Inland regions, the direct link 
between MBER and EP is significant and negative (α=-0.0118, p<0.01). With regard 
to the non-linear link, the coefficient of the linear term is significantly negative 
(β=-0.0291, p<0.01), whereas the coefficient of the quadratic term is significantly 
positive (β=0.0004, p<0.01). But we can conclude that there is a non-linear 
relationship between MBER and EP in Inland regions as F-statistic and adjusted-R
2
 
are much higher. Overall, the link between MBER and EP is negative in Eastern regions 
but non-linear in Inland regions, which provides support for H3b. 
 
4.3 Results Regression results of the link between informal regulations and EP 
Relevant regression results of the link between INFER and EP are available in Table 
9. The empirical results for the whole of China, Eastern regions and Inland regions 
are quite similar. In Model 1, the coefficient of INFER is insignificant. In Model 
2, both the coefficient of the linear term and the coefficient of the quadratic term 
are insignificant as well. All these results indicate that the link between INFER 
and EP is neutral whichever for the whole of China, Eastern regions or Inland regions. 
Thus, our H1c, H2c and H3c are all not supported.
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Table 7 Regression results of the link between CMCER and EP (Dependent variable: EP) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
The whole of China Eastern Inland   The whole of China Eastern  Inland   
C 0.8121*** 1.0040*** 0.6306*** 1.1689*** 1.4661*** 0.9562*** 
CMCER -0.0083 0.0070 -0.0176 -0.1064* -0.1124 -0.1088 
CMCER^2 
 
  0.0069* 0.0082 0.0065 
Per_GDP 0.0276** 0.0103 0.0525*** 0.0280** 0.0074 0.0544*** 
FDI -0.0747 -0.0910 1.3101 -0.1161 -0.1464 1.3341 
Energy 0.0758** 0.0175 0.1041** 0.0693** -0.0084 0.1001** 
R&D -13.5488*** -10.7654*** -17.0411*** -13.8825*** -10.9919*** -17.3651*** 
Scale 0.0702*** 0.0650*** 0.0824*** 0.0675*** 0.0634*** 0.0785*** 
Obs. 330 121 209 330 121 209 
R2 0.2543 0.2420 0.2918 0.2615 0.2497 0.2992 
Adj-R2 0.165 0.125 0.199 0.171 0.126 0.203 
F 16.71 5.533 12.64 14.82 4.897 11.16 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 8 Regression results of the link between MBER and EP (Dependent variable: EP) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
The whole of China Eastern Inland   The whole of China Eastern  Inland   
C 0.7887*** 1.1551*** 0.5813*** 0.9245*** 0.9874*** 0.7602*** 
MBER -0.0130*** -0.0257*** -0.0118*** -0.0286*** -0.0026 -0.0291*** 
MBER^2    0.0004*** -0.0013 0.0004*** 
Per_GDP 0.0218* -0.0160 0.0468*** 0.0092 -0.0124 0.0320* 
FDI -0.0908 -0.0967 -0.1586 -0.0903 -0.1119 -0.3984 
Energy  0.1505*** 0.0969 0.1824*** 0.1439*** 0.1271 0.1793*** 
R&D -12.5671*** -7.0952** -16.2146*** -11.8567*** -6.4175* -16.0509*** 
Scale 0.0624*** 0.0583*** 0.0693*** 0.0568*** 0.0688*** 0.0605*** 
Obs. 330 121 209 330 121 209 
R2 0.3024 0.2938 0.3415 0.3230 0.3005 0.3726 
Adj-R2 0.219 0.185 0.256 0.240 0.185 0.287 
F 23.61 7.38 17.17 23.82 7.01 17.56 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 9 Regression results of the link between INFER and EP (Dependent variable: EP) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
The whole of China Eastern Inland   The whole of China Eastern  Inland   
C 0.7669*** 1.0181*** 0.5553*** 0.9785*** 1.0759 0.8324*** 
INFER -0.0013 0.0034 -0.0056 -0.0525 -0.0087 -0.0752 
INFER^2    0.0032 0.0006 0.0045 
Per_GDP 0.0271** 0.0097 0.0498*** 0.0245* 0.0094 0.0448** 
FDI -0.0688 -0.0867 1.6561 -0.0953 -0.0976 1.6624 
Energy  0.0737** 0.0215 0.0948** 0.0714** 0.0214 0.0895** 
R&D -13.4819*** -10.6506*** -16.2788*** -13.7157*** -10.6759*** -17.0074*** 
Scale 0.0698*** 0.0657*** 0.0833*** 0.0701*** 0.0657*** 0.0836*** 
Obs. 330 121 209 330 121 209 
R2 0.2533 0.2417 0.2875 0.2559 0.2417 0.2935 
Adj-R2 0.164 0.125 0.195 0.164 0.117 0.197 
F 16.62 5.524 12.37 14.40 4.691 10.86 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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4.4 Discussions 
Our empirical results highlight that there is no evidence of a positive link between 
CMCER and EP, and INFER and EP in the Chinese context. In contrast, MBER has a 
significant but negative relationship with EP in Eastern regions. However, our 
hypotheses on the non-linear links are better supported in the case of CMCER and 
MBER. There is evidence that the link between CMCER and ER and the link between MBER 
and EP are non-linear for the whole of China. In the case of MBER, this non-linear 
link is supported for Inland regions as well. However, there is no evidence of either 
direct or non-linear link between INFER and EP.  
Our hypotheses on the variation of the ERs-EP links across different regions are 
partially supported. The link between MBER and EP varies across different regions, 
whereas the link between CMCER and EP and the link between INFER and EP do not vary 
across different regions. 
In the case of CMCER, the results show that the non-linear relationship for the whole 
of china and the neutral links for Eastern and Inland regions. The non-linear 
relationship is somewhat supported by the findings of Xie et al. (2017). They show 
a similar non-linear relationship between CMCER and “green” productivity. 
Undesirable outputs (i.e. CO2 emissions) are considered, when evaluating “green” 
productivity. The possible reason for the neutral links may lie in the intensity 
of mandatory regulations in Eastern and Inland regions is not enough to have positive 
impacts on firms’ behavior to improve EP, although the intensity of mandatory 
regulations has been increasing (Lin et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2015b).  
In the case of MBER, we have evidence of a significant (but negative) direct 
relationship as well as significant non-linear relationship between MBER and EP. 
Though the direct link is contrary to our hypotheses (that hypothesized significant 
positive direct relationship), the positive links are indirectly supported by the 
positive non-linear link. The positive non-linear link provides evidence for a 
“turning point” where the link becomes from being negative to positive. This is 
sketched in Figure 1. Since the quadratic term for the whole of China, and for inland 
region is positive, the negative relationship can become less negative as the 
intensity of MBER increases. When the intensity of MBER surpasses the turning point, 
MBER can have their positive impacts on EP. Xie et al. (2017) also show a non-linear 
relationship between MBER and “green” productivity.  
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Figure 1 A sketch of the direct and non-linear relationships between MBER and EP 
for the whole of China 
In the case of INFER, there are evidences of the neutral links for the whole of China, 
Eastern regions and Inland regions. These results of the neutral links are also in 
line with some prior studies (e.g. Blackman and Kildegaard, 2010; Cole et al., 2008; 
Pargal et al., 1997). One of the possible reasons is that public involvement in 
environmental issues is still limited and public environmental awareness is still 
weak in China (Liu et al., 2010; Zheng and Shi, 2017). Another reason maycould be 
that local governments may not exert enough pressures on firms or take proper 
measures to address these environmental complaints, when receiving public 
complaints from citizens. The failure to address public complaints cannot transform 
these pressures into the driving force to further affect firms’ behavior. Taken 
together, INFER now still cannot exert strong enough pressures on affecting firms’ 
behavior significantly. Thus, the link between INFER and EP is likely to be neutral.  
Our results highlight the non-linear link between CMCER and EP for the whole of China, 
and the non-linear link between MBER and EP for the whole of China and Inland regions. 
These results provide deeper insights for understanding IT and ST. IT and ST do 
support the positive impacts of institutional pressures or stakeholder pressures 
on encouraging firms to engage more in environmental initiatives, but the pressures 
can exert their positive impacts only after arriving at the certain level.  
Our results also show the link between CMCER and EP do not vary across different 
regions as well as the link between INFER and EP, but the link between MBER and EP 
varies across different regions. The variation of the link between MBER and EP across 
Turning 
Point 
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different regions support that the significant difference in economic development 
level between Eastern and Inland regions can lead local governments to implement 
ERs differently (see Table 5). Hence, ERs in different regions can exert different 
levels of pressures on affecting firms’ behavior and further shape the link between 
ERs and EP differently. Nevertheless, when the pressures that ERs exert in different 
regions are not strong enough to affect firms’ environmental practice significantly, 
ERs cannot have significant impacts on EP and the link between ERs and EP is likely 
to keep neutral still. Hence, the link between ERs and EP may not vary across 
different regions. 
It is worth highlighting here that Tables 7-9 show that the links between Per_GDP 
and EP are significantly positive for the whole of China and Inland regions but not 
for Eastern regions. This shows strong link between economic prosperity and the 
ERs-EP link. However, the nature impacts of economic development level on EP may 
be more complex in the Chinese context, since the better achievement in Per_GDP 
(Eastern regions) does not accompany a better EP, but Per_GDP can have positive 
impact on EP in less developed regions (Inland regions). Hence, the link between 
Per_GDP and EP may have been shaped differently in China.   
 
5.Conclusions 
In this paper, we use the literature to differentiate three types of ERs and 
investigate the nature of the links between different types of ERs and EP. Building 
our research upon IT and ST, we investigate both the positive relationships and the 
potential non-linear relationships, and further investigate whether the specific 
ERs-EP link varies across different regions of China (Eastern and Inland). In doing 
so, we collect the required data from different China statistical yearbooks. 30 
provinces are included finally and the time periods cover from 2004 to 2014. Our 
results indicate that, for the link between CMCER and EP, there is a non-linear 
relationship for the whole of China, whereas a neutral link has been found both in 
Eastern and Inland regions. Hence, the link between CMCER and EP does not vary across 
different regions. With respect to the link between MBER and EP, a non-linear 
relationship has been found for the whole of China and Inland regions, but a negative 
relationship has been found for Eastern regions. Hence, the variation of the link 
between MBER and EP across different regions has been verified. The link between 
INFER and EP shows different results. They are all neutral for the whole of China, 
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Eastern regions and Inland regions. Thus, the link between INFER and EP does not 
vary across different regions as well. 
Drawing on our findings, some significant implications can be derived. Firstly, 
since the negative and the neutral links have been found, to realize the positive 
impacts of ERs on EP, the central government should continue to improve the intensity 
of ERs, especially properly and strictly designed ERs are needed. Moreover, a new 
evaluation system for promoting local officials may be needed to guarantee and 
encourage ERs can be implemented strictly (Zheng and Shi, 2017). If ERs cannot be 
strictly implemented, they will exert no pressure on affecting firms’ behavior 
(Tang et al., 2003). The new evaluation system should encourage local officials to 
focus on developing economy as well as protecting the environment and prevent the 
development of economy from sacrificing the environment. Secondly, the government 
should encourage and provide more channels for stakeholders (i.e. citizens, 
communities) to engage more in environmental issues. At the same time, the government 
should also treat public complaints on environmental issues seriously so that it 
can provide further incentives for citizens to participate in environmental issues. 
Thirdly, the government should provide more different types of properly designed 
instruments. Currently, CMCER still dominate Chinese environmental policies (Xie 
et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015b). Apart from the mandatory instruments, economic 
instruments and other types of instruments are also needed. A good combination of 
all kinds of instruments can be helpful as suggested by Iraldo et al. (2011) that 
the key question is not “which instrument is best”, but “which mix of instruments 
is best”. Thus, local governments have more choices on adopting different 
instruments to regulate firms’ behavior. 
Our research has made several contributions to the literature. Firstly, this 
research provides empirical evidence for the impacts of ERs on EP from an emerging 
country. Secondly, this paper extends the literature by differentiating three 
different types of ERs and investigate the nature of the links between different 
types of ERs and EP. Thirdly, this paper enhances previous studies by investigating 
the potential non-linear relationship between ERs and EP. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first paper to investigate the non-linear links between 
different types of ERs and EP. 
Despite the contributions, our paper also has some limitations. Firstly, due to the 
limitation of data, we only use the number of complaint letters on environmental 
An earlier version of the paper accepted for publication in Journal of Cleaner Production, June 2018 
25 
 
issues to capture INFER. However, INFER may also consist of consumers, environmental 
NGOs, media pressures and so on (Zhang et al., 2008). Future study can collect more 
data and create a comprehensive index to capture INFER, then investigate whether 
INFER have non-linear impacts on EP. Furthermore, our research only focusses on the 
Chinese context. China is still a big developing country and its environmental 
governance system may have its own characteristics. Future study may collect more 
data from different countries to check whether the conclusions we obtained in this 
paper are robust or not. 
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